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SPECIAL FEATURE
DEVELOPMENTS iN ASSET
FORFEITURE LAW
Does Apprendi v. New Jersey
Change the Standard of Proof in Criminal
Forfeiture Cases?
BY STEFAN D. CASSELLA*
INTRODUCTION
n Apprendi v. New Jersey,' the Supreme Court invalidated a New
Jersey "hate crimes" statute on the ground that the statute permitted
the trial court to increase the level of punishment beyond the
statutory maximum based on a determination made under the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard, that certain factors were present. "Other
than the fact of a prior conviction," the Court held, "any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
The question now being raised in forfeiture cases is whetherApprendi
requires that issues regarding the amount of property subject to forfeiture
in a criminal case be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The author thinks that it does not.
Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, United
States Department of Justice. The views expressed in this Article are solely those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United
States Department of Justice.
' Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
2 Id at 2362-63.
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I. PRE-APPRENDILAW
Before Apprendi was decided, the appellate courts were virtually
unanimous in holding that the standard of proof in a criminal forfeiture
case was "preponderance of the evidence."3 Those courts repeatedly
3 See United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580,595 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that,
because forfeiture is part of sentencing, and fact-finding at sentencingis established
by a preponderance of the evidence, the preponderance stahdard applies to criminal
forfeiture); United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (1 Ith Cir. 1999) (holding
that because forfeiture is part of sentencing, the preponderance standard applies to
all § 853(a) forfeitures); United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556,575 (6th Cir. 1999);
United Statesv. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d511,518 (9th Cir. 1998) (maintaining that
the preponderance standard is constitutional because criminal forfeiture is not a
separate offense but only an additional penalty for an offense that was established
beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that in light ofLibretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995), the
burden of proof in a RICO case is preponderance of the evidence); United States
v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1063 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the appropriate
standard is'preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195,
1200 (7th Cir. 1997) (reiterating that the burden of proof in § 853 cases is
preponderance of the evidence because under Libretti criminal forfeiture is part of
the sentence, not an element of the underlying crime); United States v. Rogers, 102
F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that criminal forfeiture, as a sentencing
issue, is governed by the preponderance standard); United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d
1050, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (following Myers and upholding a preponderance
standard); United States v. Ben-Hur, 20 F.3d 313,317 (7th Cir. 1994) (maintaining
that the government must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant, as a matter of state law, held an ownership interest in the property at the
time the offense was committed); United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that "Congress has clearly designated criminal forfeiture as part of
the sentencing or punishment phase of a criminal proceeding and has given no
indication that a higher standard of proof applies than normally applies at
sentencing"); United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that criminal forfeiture is part of the sentence, not an offense or element of the
offense); United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 697 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the preponderance standard applies to § 853(a)(1) forfeitures and that due
process does not bar Congress from permitting sentencing issues to be resolved by
the preponderance standard and that because forfeiture is part of sentencing, a
preponderance standard is unobjectionable if that is what Congress intended);
United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045, 1050-53 (6th Cir. 1992) (maintaining that
forfeiture is part of sentencing which is governed by the preponderance standard,
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emphasized that forfeiture is an aspect of sentencing in a criminal case, not
an element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some courts focused on the language of the forfeiture statute itself. For
example, in United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega,4 the Ninth Circuit
observed that 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) directs a court "imposing sentence" on a
person convicted of a drug offense to enter an order of forfeiture "in
addition to any other sentence imposed "5 This language, the court held,
makes it clear "that the forfeiture is additional punishment for the crime,
not an element of the crime."
The Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits drew the same conclusion
from the same statutory provision and the parallel provision in 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a), the forfeiture provision for money laundering offenses.7 The
Fourth Circuit took the statutory analysis a step further. In UnitedStates v.
Tanner,8 the court held that the direction in § 853(a) to enter a forfeiture
judgment against any person convicted of a violation of the drug laws
"presupposes that the defendant has already been tried and convicted of the
substantive offense." This language in Tanner makes it clear that the
and thus the same standard applies to forfeiture of proceeds and facilitating
property); see also United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231,234-35 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1541-42 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1576-77 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1987). But see Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1083
(holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies to RICO, but not in the money
laundering context); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881,902-04 (3d Cir. 1994)
("Obviously any violation of § 1962 [RICO] must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
4United States v. Hemandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560 (9th Cir. 1989).
5 Id. at 1577 (emphasis added).
6Id.
7 See Dicter, 198 F.3d at 1289 ("The language of section 853(a) itself makes
clear that its forfeiture provisions are elements of sentencing."); Voigt, 89 F.3d at
1083 ("[T]he plain language of the statute reveals that forfeiture is a form of
sentence enhancement that follows a previous finding of personal guilt" (quoting
Myers, 21 F.3d at 826, 829)); Myers, 21 F.3d at 829 ('By stating that '[t]he court,
in imposing sentence on a person convicted' of a money laundering offense, shall
forfeitproperty involved in the offense, Congress indicates that forfeiture under the
money laundering provision is also a sentencing sanction, not an offense or element
of an offense.").
8United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1995).
9Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
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forfeiture is not a separate offense, but a part of the punishment imposed
on a person who has already been convicted."
Other courts based their analyses more generally on the relationship
between the forfeiturejudgment and the underlying criminal conviction. As
the First Circuit held in UnitedStates v. Rogers," forfeiture bears the same
relationship to the crime as does a jail sentence or a fine. 2 It is a conse-
quence of finding that the defendant is culpable for having committed the
offense, not a finding of culpability itself. Thus, as the Third Circuit
observed: "The argument that forfeiture is an element which must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt confuses culpability with conse-
quences."' 3
The point is that forfeiture only comes into play once ajury has found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the underlying
offense. No additional factor is necessary to trigger the forfeiture. It flows
automatically from the conviction. The Sixth Circuit made that point in
United States v. Smith: 4 "Although a criminal forfeiture proceeding bears
some characteristics of a criminal matter, its purpose is to determine the
proper punishment for the charged offense once the defendant's guilt on
that charge has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'5
"[B]ecause the criminal forfeiture provision does not itself describe a
separate offense," the Ninth Circuit concluded, "but is merely an 'addi-
tional penalty' for an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt," allowing the government to prove that the property was subject to
forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate any of the
criminal defendant's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 6
The Fifth Circuit extended this rule to another context. In UnitedStates
v. Cantu,' the court bifurcated the trial between the guilt phase and the
forfeiture phase. When a juror was unable to continue with the jury
10 Id .
" United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641 (1st Cir. 1996).
2 Id. at 648 ("[T]he criminal forfeiture is akin to a jail sentence or a fine and
lacks the historical and moral roots that have led to a higher proof requirement for
a finding of criminal guilt.").
3 United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 875 (3d Cir. 1987).
14 United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1992).
I5 Id. at 1052. See also United States v. Ben Hur, 20 F.3d 313, 317 (7th Cir.
1994) ("Procedurally, a forfeiture authorized by section 853 operates as a sanction
against the defendant based upon his conviction.") (citation omitted).
16 United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1998).
'7 United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1999).
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deliberations during the guilt phase, the defendant agreed to proceed with
an eleven-member jury pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.18 The defendant did not agree, however, to have an
eleven-member jury determine the forfeiture issue. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that because the forfeiture did not constitute a separate offense,
and because the defendant therefore had no constitutional right to a jury
trial on the forfeiture issue in the first place, he had no grounds upon which
to complain about the forfeiture verdict returned by the eleven-member
jury9
Thus, before Apprendi was decided, it was well-established that
criminal forfeiture was not a separate offense with elements that must be
presented to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN APPRENDI
In Apprendi, a defendant was convicted under aNew Jersey statute that
normally carried a penalty of five to ten years imprisonment. After a
contested evidentiary hearing, however, the sentencing judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the crime was motivated by racial bias.
Based on this finding, thejudge applied a separate statute that increased the
maximum sentence for racially-motivated crimes to twenty years, and
sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment. The sentence was
upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court, but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the sentencing procedure violated the defendant's
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens emphasized two related
objections to the New Jersey statute. First, a statute that allows atrial judge
to impose a sentence outside of the statutory maximum, based on facts that
are not among the elements of the underlying crime, creates a separate
offense with elements that are never presented to a jury. This violates a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have all elements of the offense
presented to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Second, such
a statute exposes a defendant to a level of punishment beyond what could
be imposed for the offense on which the jury returned a verdict, thus
exposing the defendant to a greater stigma and risk than authorized for the
offense on which he was tried and convicted.
Is FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
19 Cantu, 167 F.3d at 206-07.2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2349-50 (2000).
21 Id. at 2354-66.
n Id.
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A. The Elements of a Separate Offense
The Court recognized that judges have broad discretion to impose a
sentence within the statutory range for a given crime, but judges generally
may not impose a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.' The New
Jersey statute, however, permitted the trial judge to sentence the defendant
outside of the statutory maximum based on facts that were never presented
to the jury. In so doing, the New Jersey statute in effect created a separate
legal offense.
The Court made this point several times in its opinion. For example, in
discussing the historic role of the judiciary in sentencing, the Court noted
that "[t]he judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by
the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury. Put simply,
facts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise
legally prescribed were by definition 'elements' of a separate legal
offense."24
The New Jersey statute, the Court said, created a second mens rea
element, exposing the defendant to greater punishment if he selected his
victims with a purpose to intimidate them on account of their race. "The
defendant's intent in committing a crime," the Court said, "is perhaps
as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element.' "
Later, the Court reiterated the point when discussing the proper use of
"sentencing factors":
[W]hen the term "sentence enhancement" is used to describe an increase
beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the
jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of
an "element" of the offense.26
Allowing ajudge to determine the facts that constitute a separate legal
offense, and to impose a sentence accordingly, the Court said, violates the
"basic principles... of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a
statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt."'27
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2359.
2 Id. at 2364 (footnote omitted).
2 Id. at 2365 n. 19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
27Id. at 2359.
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A state simply cannot deprive a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right
to have the jury determine all elements of an offense beyond a reason-
able doubt" 'by redefin[ing] the elements that constitute different crimes
... as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.' " According-
ly, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."
29
B. Increasing the Degree of Culpability
The Court was also concerned that the New Jersey statute exposed the
defendant to a greater degree of punishment than was authorized for the
offense on which the jury returned a verdict. The "[c]ore concerns
animating the jury and burden-of-proof requirements," the Court said, are
that the defendant not be exposed to "a deprivation of liberty greater than
that authorized by the verdict according to the statute," nor to "a greater
stigma than that accompanying thejury verdict alone."3 The Court further
stated: "If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute
when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others,
it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the
offense are heightened .... "I
In other words, ajury's verdict on a criminal offense establishes the
outer limits on the punishment to which the defendant may be exposed.
Those limits are delineated by the penalty provisions of the criminal statute
itself. Factors that assist the court in determining the sentence need not be
presented to a jury nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the
sentence falls" 'within limits fixed by law' 32 and "the range of sentencing
options prescribed by the legislature."33 A sentence that falls within those
limits violates none of the defendant's constitutional rights because he is
exposed to no greater degree of criminal culpability than is legally triggered
by the jury's verdict. But a statute that exposes the defendant to "a more
severe sentence than the maximum authorized by the facts found by the
jury" violates his right to due process.
' Id. at 2360 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
291d. at 2362-63.
30Id. at 2363 n.16.
31Id. at 2359 (emphasis added).
32Id. at 2358 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
33 Id. (citation omitted).
34Id. at n.9.
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Thus, "the relevant inquiry," the Court held, "is one not of form, but of
effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" '3
Ill. APPLICATION OF APPRENDI TO CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
The twin themes of the Apprendi analysis suggest that the Court's
holding applies in either of two situations: where the legislature has, in
effect, created two separate offenses, with separate elements, with the
second or greater offense carrying a heavier punishment than the first; and
where the statutory scheme allows a court to impose a punishment for a
single offense that lies beyond "the range of sentencing options" authorized
by the legislature based on the jury's verdict alone. Neither of these
concerns applies to criminal forfeiture.
As the Supreme Court itself defined the issue, Apprendi involved a
finding that the defendant was culpable for two separate acts: he "unlaw-
fully possessed a weapon," and "selected his victims with a purpose to
intimidate them because of their race." '36 The holding in the case is based
on the Court's conclusion that the "procedural safeguards" of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments "should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey
has singled out for punishment."37
In contrast, a criminal case in which forfeiture is imposed as part of the
sentence does not involve culpability for separate acts. Forfeiture is the
consequence of the finding that the defendant was culpable for a single act.
As the Third Circuit observed, "[t]he argument that forfeiture is an element
which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt confuses culpability with
consequences."38
Moreover, the entry of an order of forfeiture as part of a criminal
sentence does not impose upon the defendant any greater punishment than
was authorized for the single offense for which the defendant has been
convicted. Forfeiture is a mandatory part of the sentence that may be
imposed for any criminal offense that contains a criminal forfeiture
provision. Thus, the imposition of ajudgment of forfeiture falls squarely
within the "range of sentencing options" to which the defendant is exposed
based on the jury verdict alone.
35 Id. at 2365 (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 2355.
37 Id. (emphasis added).
31 United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 875 (3d Cir. 1987).
[VOL. 89
APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY
A. Criminal Forfeiture is not a Separate Offense
The Supreme Court has already determined that criminal forfeiture is
not a separate offense with separate elements. In Libretti v. UnitedStates,39
the defendant pled guilty to running a continuing criminal enterprise in
violation of21 U.S.C. § 848, and agreed to the forfeiture of his assets under
§ 853(a). At the plea hearing, the district judge determined that the
defendant's plea was voluntary. However, on appeal, the defendant insisted
that the forfeiture nevertheless should be set aside because the court
neglected to establish a "factual basis" for the forfeiture as required by
Rule 1 l(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that Rule 1 (f)
requires a factual inquiry only with respect to the defendant's admission of
guilt to a substantive offense. Forfeiture, the Court said, is not a substantive
offense, but is only part of the sentence imposed for the offense to which
the defendant pled guilty!' The Court's ruling was quite clear: "Congress
plainly intended forfeiture of assets to operate as punishment for criminal
conduct in violation of the federal drug and racketeering laws, not as a
separate substantive offense. "2
Libretti insisted that criminal forfeiture was "not 'simply' an aspect of
sentencing, but is, in essence, a hybrid that shares elements of both a
substantive charge and a punishment imposed for criminal activity."43 In
support, he pointed, among other things, to language in the Supreme
Court's own opinion in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
44
suggesting that "forfeiture is a substantive charge in the indictment"45 But
the Court expressly disavowed the language in Caplin & Drysdale, noting
that elsewhere in the same opinion, the Court "recognized that forfeiture is
a 'criminal sanction,' and is imposed as a sentence under § 853."
In sum, the Court held that because "criminal forfeiture is an element
of the sentence imposed for a violation of certain drug and racketeering
laws," and is not "an element of the offense to be alleged and proved," the
39 Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995).
40 Id. at 37-38.
41 Id. at 38-39.
421 d. at 39 (emphasis added).
431d. at 40.
' Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
4 5 Id. at 628 n.5.
' Libretti, 516 U.S. at 40 (citations omitted).
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requirements of Rule 1 (f) did not apply.47 Accordingly, the Court found
that when a defendant pleads guilty to a substantive offense, the trial
court's determination that there is a factual basis for the plea is essential
but, because forfeiture is part of the sentence and not an offense, the only
inquiry with respect to the forfeiture is whether the defendant's plea is
knowing and voluntary, "not whether it is factually sound."
Libretti also challenged the criminal forfeiture on the very ground that
was central to the Court's holding in Apprendi: he argued that his
agreement to the criminal forfeiture was invalid because the trial judge
failed to advise him that he was waiving a "constitutional right" to have the
forfeiture determined by a jury. The Supreme Court disagreed4 9
Libretti's argument, the Court said, was that the Court should equate
his right to have ajury determine the forfeitability of his property "with the
familiar Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt or
innocence."' Anticipating what it would later emphasize in Apprendi, the
Court acknowledged that "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendantthe
right to demand that ajury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime
with which he is charged."' But there is, however, no Sixth Amendment
right to have the jury determine the issue of criminal forfeiture. Again, the
Court was exceedingly clear: "[O]ur analysis of the nature of criminal
forfeiture as an aspect of sentencing compels the conclusion that the right
to a jury verdict on forfeitability does not fall within the Sixth Amend-
ment's constitutional protection."52
It was this conclusion that led to the Fifth Circuit's recent holding that
a defendant has no constitutional right to have a forfeiture determined by
a twelve-member jury,53 and to the consensus among the appellate courts
that forfeiture need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent that the Supreme Court's holding inApprendi was based
on the notion that the New Jersey statute created a separate offense, with
separate elements that had to be presented to ajury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, Libretti forecloses the application of that decision to
criminal forfeiture. Libretti clearly holds that criminal forfeiture is not an
element of the offense that must be alleged and proved, and it holds that
47Id. at41.
4 1 Id. at42.
49Id. at48.
1o Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
511d. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,511 (1995)).
52 Id.
3See supra note 19 and accompanying text
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there is no Sixth Amendment right to have the forfeiture presented to a
jury. Accordingly, a court cannot apply Apprendi's "separate offense"
rationale to a criminal forfeiture case without concluding that Libretti has
been overruled.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, however, so
much as mentions criminal forfeiture; nor does the court have any occasion
to cite Libretti. Thus, it would be extraordinary to conclude that the
Supreme Court intended to overrule its recent precedent in that case.
There is an analogy that supports the above conclusion in recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Austin v. United States,' the Supreme
Court held, for the first time, that civil forfeitures constitute punishment for
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Shortly
after that holding was announced, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits held that Austin required them to find, notwithstanding a
long line of Supreme Court precedents to the contrary, that civil forfeiture
constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. ss The appellate courts recognized that the Supreme
Court had never before considered civil forfeiture to implicate double
jeopardy, but they concluded that the decision in Austin must have meant
that the Court had "changed its collective mind," and "adopted a new test
for determining whetheranominally civil sanction constitutes 'punishment'
for double jeopardy purposes."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in United States v.
Ursery,7 a decision that reversed the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on this issue,
noted that nothing in Austin nor in any of the other recent Supreme Court
cases on which the lower courts had relied related in any way to the
application ofdoublejeopardy law to civil forfeiture, and the Chief Justice
chastised the lower courts for assuming that the Supreme Court would
reverse its precedents without saying so in cases that had nothing to do with
the issue at hand. "It would have been quite remarkable," the Chief Justice
wrote, "for this Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established
practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having
even suggested that it was doing so:"
To apply Apprendi to criminal forfeiture law would be to repeat the
same error that the lower courts committed in the double jeopardy cases.
I Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
5
1 See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
56 $405,089.32 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218-19.
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
51 Id. at 288.
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The Supreme Court clearly held in Libretti that criminal forfeiture is not a
separate offense and that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
have ajury determine the forfeiture. Nothing in Apprendi suggests that the
Supreme Court has "changed its collective mind" and intended to overrule
Libretti without giving the least suggestion that it was doing so. Again,
Apprendi neither mentions criminal forfeiture nor cites Libretti. Hence, it
would be extraordinary fora lower court to determine that, notwithstanding
Libretti, criminal forfeitures must now be submitted to a jury in all
instances and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Criminal Forfeiture Does not Lie Outside the Statutory Maximum
The second basis for the holding in Apprndi was that a defendant may
not be subjected to greater punishment for the commission of a criminal
offense than is authorized for that offense alone. The punishment, in other
words, must fall within the range of sentencing options for that offense.
Criminal forfeiture, however, does not expose the defendant to any
punishment outside the scope of the sanctions that may be imposed for the
offense presented to the jury. Because forfeiture is a mandatory part of the
sentence for any offense for which it is authorized, it is part of the
maximum penalty to which the defendant is exposed based solely on the
jury's determination that the elements of the underlying offense have been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
InApprendi, the Court clearly stated its concern: the defendantmay not
be exposed "to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict."'59 But in every case in which the criminal forfeiture statutes
apply, the forfeiture "is authorized by the jury's verdict."
In Alexander v. United States,' the Supreme Court observed that "a
RICO conviction subjects the violator not only to traditional, though
stringent, criminal fines and prison terms, but also mandatory forfeiture
under § 1963. "61 And in United States v. Monsanto,' the Court said,
"Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that
forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied .. .. "63 The
Ninth Circuit recently held that criminal forfeiture is mandatory upon
conviction because it is designed to ensure that a defendant does not profit
59Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2365 (2000) (footnote omitted).
0 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 562 (1993).61 d. at 562.
62United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
631 d. at 606.
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from his crimes,' and other courts have held that criminal forfeiture is a
mandatory consequence of the defendant's conviction for drug trafficking,
money laundering, and other offenses.' Most important, the recently-
enacted general criminal forfeiture provision, which authorizes forfeiture
of the proceeds of hundreds of crimes in the federal criminal code, provides
that "upon conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property
in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Controlled
Substances Act""
Because criminal forfeiture is automatically mandated as part of the
sentence for a criminal offense, based solely on the jury's guilty verdict
with respect to the underlying crime, the imposition of the forfeiture does
not lie outside the scope of the sentence that may be imposed based on the
jury's verdict alone. As mentioned above, a number of appellate courts
adopted this rationale in holding-before Apprendi was decided-that the
preponderance standard applies to criminal forfeitures.67
This interpretation of Apprendi is also consistent with post-Apprendi
rulings of the Courts of Appeals. For example, in UnitedStates v. Aguayo-
Delgado,6s the Eighth Circuit was presented with the question whether
Apprendi invalidated a sentence imposed under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines based on the court's determination, made by a preponderance
"See United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999).
See United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that be-
cause criminal forfeiture is mandatory, the court's failure to impose forfeiture is
appealable as an unlawful sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)); United States v.
Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1075 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that courts may not ignore
mandatory language of forfeiture statute and give defendant option of substituting
cash for forfeited items, unless 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) applies); United States v.
Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1134 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that criminal forfeiture for
money laundering under § 982(a)(1) is mandatory); United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d
232, 235 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that under § 853(a)(2), criminal forfeiture of
property used to facilitate a drug trafficking offense "is mandatory, not
discretionary"); United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 175 (7th Cir. 1994)
(providing for mandatory forfeiture ofproperty in cases involving a conviction for
money laundering).
"28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (emphasis added). This statute, taken together with 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which provides for the civil forfeiture of the proceeds of any
crime listed within the definition of "specified unlawful activity" in the money
laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), may be used to include a criminal
forfeiture allegation in any criminal indictment that charges any of the most
commonly prosecuted federal crimes.
67 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
68 United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000).
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of the evidence, that certain sentencing factors were present. In its analysis
of Apprendi, the panel noted that the decision required judges to operate
"within the limits of the legal penalties provided"69 by the statute. Only if
the "defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by the statute."70 is
there a violation of the defendant's due process rights. The court continued:
Thus, if the government wishes to seek penalties in excess of those
applicable by virtue of the elements of the offense alone, then the
government must charge the facts giving rise to the increased sentence in
the indictment, and must prove those facts to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
71
The key point, the panel concluded, was that "[t]he rule of Apprendi
only applies where the non-jury factual determination increases the
maximum sentence beyond the statutory range authorized by the jury's
verdict." Because the factual determination inAguayo-Delgado resulted
in a sentence that fell within the range of sentences that could have been
imposed based on the jury verdict alone, Apprendi did not apply.'
Again, criminal forfeiture is a penalty applicable in criminal cases "by
virtue of the elements of the offense alone;"74 the imposition of the
forfeiture does not increase the "degree of culpability," or heighten the
69 Id. at 932 (citing United States v. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)).
701d. (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 933 (emphasis added).
72 Id.
ISee id. at 934. See also United States v. Hemandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017,
1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding "that a sentence that fell within ten-year sentence for
alien smuggling may be determined by the Court by a preponderance of the
evidence without implicating Apprendi"); Hemandez v. United States, 226 F.3d
839, 841 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that because the statutory maximum for
kidnapping is life in prison, any sentence could be imposed by the court alone,
based on factors determined by a preponderance of the evidence, without violating
the rule in Apprendi); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575-77 (5th Cir.
2000) (concluding that the determination of the drug quantity, by a preponderance
of the evidence, did not violate Apprendi where the sentence was within the
statutory maximum); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a sentence that falls within the twenty-year maximum penalty for
RICO may be determined by the court by a preponderance of the evidence without
implicating Apprend); Doe v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (D.NJ.
2000) (holding that the determination of the drug quantity by a preponderance of
the evidence did not violate ApprendO.
74See supra note 71 and accompanying text
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"stigma" attached to the conviction, beyond what is "authorized by the
jury's verdict."75 Once the defendant is convicted, the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the offense, or the property involved in or used to commit the
offense, inevitably follows. All that is required of the finder of fact in a
criminal case is to determine precisely what property may be forfeited in
accordance with the terms of the forfeiture statute-a determination
entirely analogous to the court's determination, pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines, of where to set the sentencing level within the maximum range
authorized by statute.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself viewed its ruling in Apprendi in
similar terms. The dissenting Justices in Apprendi argued that the
constitutional rule announced by the Court would render invalid state
capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after ajury verdict holding a
defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors
before imposing a death sentence.76 The majority, however, explained that
that was not so. Once ajury has found the defendant guilty of a crime that
carries the maximum sentence of death, the Court noted, it may be left to
the judge to decide whether to impose the maximum sentence or a lesser
one. Because a jury verdict alone in a capital case exposes a defendant to
the maximum punishment, a judge's action does not transform the nature
of the crime into a greater offense.77 As Justice Scalia said in his concurring
opinion, the defendant's right is "to have a jury determine those facts that
determine the maximum sentence the law allows." '78 Once the jury
determines those facts, the defendant faces whatever consequences the
legislature has provided for that offense, "[b]ut the criminal will never get
more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime, and his guilt
of the crime... will be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the
unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow citizens."79
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently held that a defendant in a so-
called "drug kingpin" case,8" for which the prescribed sentencing range is
thirty years to life, has no right, underApprendi, to have the jury determine
factors that make the life sentence mandatory.8' Because a life sentence
falls within the range of consequences prescribed for the underlying
75See supra note 64 and accompanying text.76See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2366 (2000).
77 See id.
78 Id. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
79
1d.
8 0 See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
81 See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2000).
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offense, the imposition of the life sentence does not expose the defendant
to punishment any greater than he could have received based on the factors
presented to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt' 2
The above is also true in criminal forfeiture cases. The defendant
knows at the outset of trial that criminal forfeiture is part of the sentence
that may be imposed upon conviction of the offense presented to the jury.
If the defendant is convicted, the amount of the forfeiture is determined by
a preponderance of the evidence, and may in some circumstances be
determined by the court, not the jury; in all cases, however, the forfeiture
will fall within the strictures of the statute authorizing forfeiture for the
offense. Thus, the defendant "will never get more punishment than he
bargained for,"' and his guilt of the crime giving rise to the forfeiture will
have been determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.
IV. THE SIXTH CIRcuIT's RULING IN UNITED STATES V. CORRADO
Two appellate courts have already held that Apprendi does not apply
to criminal forfeiture. In United States v. Corrado," defendants, all
members of the Detroit Cosa Nostra, were convicted of RICO offenses
involving extortion and other crimes. On the basis of those convictions, the
government alleged that the defendants werejointly and severally liable for
the forfeiture of more than $5.4 million derived from a number of different
schemes through which one or another of the defendants had conducted the
RICO enterprise.85Defendants waived their right to have the forfeiture determined by the
jury, leaving it to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, what
property each of the defendants was required to forfeit.' Although the
court found that the racketeering scheme involved the extortion of funds
from numerous victims over a period of time, the court held that it was
impossible-based on the evidence presented at trial-to quantify the
amount of money actually obtained.87 Because it found that the total
amount of proceeds was unquantifiable, and that there was no evidence of
how much each defendant had realized from the scheme, the court entered
82 1d.
83 Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2000).851 Id. at 547.
861d.
871d. at 547-48.
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ajudgment forfeiting zero dollars.' The government appealed this determi-
nation.89
Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on two grounds. First, the
defendants argued that no statute authorized a government appeal from a
criminal forfeiture order. ° Second, they argued that even if there were
statutory authority for such an appeal, the entry of a judgment of "zero
forfeiture" was the functional equivalent of an "acquittal," and appeals
from acquittals in criminal cases are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment"9 The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments.'
On the first point, the panel acknowledged that the government has no
right of appeal in a criminal case unless a statute expressly grants such a
right. It noted, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) authorizes government
appeals from any sentence in a criminal case that is "imposed in violation
of law." 3 Because forfeiture is a mandatory part of the sentence in any
criminal case for which forfeiture is authorized, the failure of a trial court
to enter a judgment of forfeiture would constitute a sentence "imposed in
violation of law," assuming that the forfeiture is supported by the facts.'
Therefore, government appeals from the refusal of a court to enter a
judgment of forfeiture in a criminal case are authorized by § 3742(b).'
In support of their double jeopardy argument, the defendants relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi. 6 They argued that if a factor
that increases the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum is
an element of a separate offense,.as Apprendi holds, then a determination
adverse to the government on that point-i.e., a finding that the factor has
not been established-is the functional equivalent of an acquittal, and
consequently, an appeal from the adverse ruling is barred.97
Defendants' argument hinged, of course, on the notion that Apprendi
applies to criminal forfeiture, and that criminal forfeiture issues therefore
must be submitted to ajury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Only if
that were so would the failure to establish the forfeiture at trial constitute
88 Id.
89 Id.
90Id. at 548.
91 Id.
92Id. at 558.
91 I at 549.
9 Id.
95Id.
9Id. at 550.
97Id.
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an acquittal that barred an appeal on double jeopardy grounds. The Sixth
Circuit, however, held thatApprendi does not apply to criminal forfeiture."8
Consistent with Libretti, the Sixth Circuit panel held that criminal
forfeiture is not a separate offense with elements that must be submitted to
a jury. To the contrary, criminal forfeiture is an aspect of the punishment
that is imposed following the conviction on a substantive criminal offense.
The Sixth Circuit found that the Constitution requires only that the jury
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the
offense giving rise to the forfeiture. Once that determination is made, the
forfeiture automatically follows, just like any other aspect of the punish-
ment prescribed by the statute setting forth the punishment for that
offense. 9
"There is no requirement under Apprendi, or in any other precedent
cited by the defendants," the court said, "that thejury pass upon the extent
of a forfeiture... ." "Accordingly," the court concluded, "we reject the
defendants' argument that the jury must decide the extent of forfeiture or
that the district court, as the agreed trier of fact, must make fact determina-
tions based on the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard."' ' The Sixth
Circuit concluded that, because Apprendi did not apply, and the forfeiture
was therefore only an aspect of the sentence, there was no double jeopardy
bar to the government' s appeal from the trial court's order refusing to enter
an order of forfeiture.
Similarly, in UnitedStates v. Powell,"° the defendants were convicted
of drug offenses and ordered to forfeit real property that was traceable to
drug proceeds. On appeal, they sought to overturn the forfeiture, inter alia,
on the ground that the trial court had instructed the jury to determine the
forfeitability of the property under the preponderance of the evidence
standard. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit rejected
that contention.
"The Supreme Court has held that forfeiture is not an independent
offense, but is only part of the sentence imposed for the underlying drug
offense," the panel said, citing Libretti. Thus, as almost all courts have
previously held, "the burden of proof on a forfeiture count is preponderance
of the evidence."1 °3 Nothing inApprendi changes this, the panel concluded,
because as part of the sentence for the underlying offense, the forfeiture
98 Id. at 550-5 1.
99Id. at 551.
100 Id. at 550.
"' Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
1
02 United States v. Powell, 2001 WL 51010 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2001) (Table).
"o3Id. (citing United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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does not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Thus,
Apprendi does not require the trier of fact to make factual determinations
relating to the forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt."°4
V. APPRENDI'S EFFECr ON RULE 32.2
Finally, applying Apprendi to criminal forfeiture would do more than
change the standard of proof from "preponderance of the evidence" to
"beyond a reasonable doubt" and require that all forfeiture matters be
presented to ajury. Beyond that, it is at least arguable that Apprendi would
invalidate two key provisions of the new Rule of Federal Criminal
Procedure governing criminal forfeitures, a rule that the Supreme Court
approved only weeks before the decision in Apprendi was announced.
Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"0 5 provides that
a court may issue an order of forfeiture in a criminal case in generic
terms-i.e., without listing specific assets. For example, a court may order
a defendant to forfeit all proceeds of the drug trafficking offense for which
he or she was convicted, up to a certain amount that the court (or ajury) has
determined by a preponderance of the evidence,"° even though the
government has not yet located the money itself. The Rule goes on to
provide that once the order of forfeiture is entered, the government may
conduct post-conviction discovery, in accordance with the applicable
forfeiture statute, to locate the property subject to forfeiture.10 7
Once that property is located, the government may move, pursuant to
Rule 32.2(e)(IXA), to amend the order "to include property that is subject
to forfeiture under an existing order... but was located and identified after
104 See also United States v. Messino, 2001 WL 123799 (N.D. 11. Jan. 31,2001)
(following Corrado and holding that a preponderance standard still applies in the
Seventh Circuit).1o See Supreme Court Actions, 68 U.S.L.W. 2637 (Apr. 17,2000).
106 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(e) advisory committee's note.
As a practical matter, courts have also determined that they, not the jury,
must determine the forfeitability of assets discovered after the trial is over
and the jury has been dismissed. See United States v. Saccoccia, 898 F.
Supp. 53 (D.R.L 1995) (holding that the government may conduct post-trial
discovery to determine location and identity of forfeitable assets; post-trial
discovery resulted in discovery of gold bars buried in defendant's mother's
backyard several years after the entry of an order directing the defendant to
forfeit all property, up to $137 million, involved in his money laundering
offense).
Id.
107 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(m) (2000).
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that order was entered." ' The government, of course, must establish that
the newly-identified property is subject to forfeiture."°9 But it is the court
alone, not the jury, that makes that determination."0
IfApprendi applies to criminal forfeiture cases, the determination that
property is subject to forfeiture will have to be made by ajury. But what
about property that has not yet been located at the time of the trial? If the
government does not locate the forfeitable property until months or years
after the trial is over, is it sufficient that a jury determined, at the time of
trial, that all proceeds, or other property involved in the offense, were
subject to forfeiture up to a maximum amount? If that is the case, then Rule
32.2(e)(3) is constitutional, and the subsequent identification of specific
property as falling within the scope of the jury's finding may be left to the
court. But it is at least arguable that every time the government seeks to
amend an order of forfeiture to include newly-identified property the court
must empanel a new jury, and prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
newly-identified property is, in fact, the property that the trial jury said the
government was entitled to forfeit. Such an interpretation ofthe rule would
make criminal forfeiture impractical in many cases.
Moreover, the application of Apprendi to criminal forfeiture calls into
question the provision in Rule 32.2(a) that permits the government to allege
forfeiture in generic terms in the indictment. Recent case law and the
Advisory Notes to Rule 32.2 make clear that the government is required
only to put the defendant on notice that it will be seeking the forfeiture of
his property in the event of a conviction."' While as a practical matter it is
often done, it is not necessary for the government to list in the indictment
each of the items subject to forfeiture, nor must the government specify
what theory of forfeiture pertains to each item."' In other words, under
108 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(e)(1)(A).
109 Id. at 32.2(e)(2).
10 Id. at 32.2(e)(3) ("There is no right to a trial by jury under Rule 32.2(e).").
I" See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32.2 advisory committee's notes.
" 2 SeeUnited States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247, 1257 (1lth Cir. 1999) (stating that
the government complies withRule 7(c)(2) and due process ifthe indictment tracks
language of the forfeiture statute, and the government informs defendant of its
intent to forfeit specific assets after the guilty verdict and before the forfeiture
phase of the trial begins); United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293,1315 n.17 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that it is not necessary to specify in either the indictment or a
bill of particulars that the government sought forfeiture of defendant's salary, and
that, to comply with Rule 7(c), the government need only put defendant on notice
that it would seek to forfeit everything subject to forfeiture under the applicable
statute, such as all property "acquired or maintained" as a result of a RICO
violation); FED. R. CRim. P. 32.2 advisory committee's note ("[S]ubdivision (a) is
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Rule 32.2(a), it is sufficient for the indictment to include an allegation that
the government, in the event of a conviction, will seek the forfeiture of all
proceeds of the defendant's drug trafficking offense, and all property used
to facilitate that offense.
As the Fifth Circuit recently observed, Apprendi addressed only
whether certain facts must be proved and found by ajury. It did not address
whether these facts must also be alleged in the indictment. But the opinion
of the Court, read in conjunction with the Court's earlier opinion in Jones
v. United States,"' "clearly indicates that a fact which must be proved to
the jury is an element of the offense that must also be alleged in the
indictment."' 14 If that is so, then it may be necessary-notwithstanding the
clear intent of Rule 32.2(a)--for the government to allege in the indictment
each asset that is subject to forfeiture and its relationship to the underlying
criminal offense. Again, because of the difficulty in ascertaining what
property a defendant may have used to commit an offense or was derived
from an offense, such a rule would render criminal forfeiture impractical
in many cases.
CONCLUSION
Nothing in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey compels the conclusion that a criminal forfeiture must be presented
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi does not
overturn the well-established rule of Libretti v. United States that criminal
forfeiture is not a separate offense with elements that must be alleged and
proved. Nor is.Apprendi inconsistent with the view that criminal forfeiture
falls within the range of sentencing options that are prescribed by Congress
as a consequence of the defendant's conviction for a criminal offense.
Accordingly, Apprendi does not disturb the prevailing view that the factors
supporting a criminal forfeiture judgment may be established by the court
under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
not intended to require that an itemized list of the property to be forfeited appear
in the indictment or information itself.... It does not require a substantive
allegation in which the property subject to forfeiture, or the defendant's interest in
the property, must be described in detail.') (citation omitted).
113 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
"4 United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
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